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This addendum updates A TM 50 1-B ASE by : 
1. Replacement of the old 16 Channel .MUX FMECA work sheets, 
pages 3.9.49;50; and 51 (3 pages) with nine new FMECA work 
sheets. This change is- a result o£ change to a new BxA supplied 
MUX. See Attachment 1. The new MUX FMECA is also called 
out in ATM 912 dated 8/?.D/70. 
2. Addition of four (4) FMECA work sheets to Section 3. 9 to cover 
EMI modifications. These sheets are also found in A TM 840 
dated 11/5/69. See Attachment II. 
3. Addition of one FMECA work sheet to Section 3. 9 to cover changes 
in the Central Station. See Attachment III. 
The FMECA work sheet in Attachments I, ll, and II are to be added 




R. W. Hiebert 
Reliability Engineer 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This analysis is detailed at the Active Seismic Experiment electronic 
modification level for Array D as a supplement to the ALSEP Failure Mode, 
Effects, and Criticality Analysis, A TM 50 lB. A TM 501B includes the ASE 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis at the experiment and sub-
system level. Each potential failure is considered in light of the probability 
of occurence, failure mode distribution and its effect on experiment success. 
1. 2 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this supplement is to update the failure mode, effects, 
and criticality analysis of modifications made to the ASE/CSE for Array D. 
I. 3 ASE/CSE MODIFICATIONS 
The following ASE/CSE modifications have been incorporated into the 
Active Seismic Experiment for Array D. 
A. Use of BxA 16 Channel Mux and A/D converter (see en-
closure 1 ). 
B. The 16 channel EMI modification included the following: 
(1) Added capacitor ClO (. 01._., F) to A/D converter board No. I 
for filtering. 
(2) Changed Rl (2. 701/4w) to Ll (100 !J.hy) choke to reduce 
ripple on A/D converter board No. 2. 
(3) Added ~apacitor C 11 (470 pfd) to A/D Converter Analog 
Assy for filtering. 
C. The ASE/ CSE Thumper R TE Initial Revel Modification included 
the following: 
(1) Removal of capacitor Cl02 (22 pfd) used to preset flip flop. 
(2) Added blocking diodes CR 102 and CR 103 (SM1N914). 
D. The EMI modifications specified in (enclosure 2) were made 
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r 2. 0 FAILURE MODES_, EFFECTS & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
The failure mode and effects analysis for the active Seismic Experiment 
~ 
m.odifications to Array D on a piece part level are documented in enclosure 
3. The criticality ranking for those modifications contained in enclosure 3 
are as follows: 
Criticality Ranking 
I Loss of Experiment 
II Degradation of Experiment 
3. 0 SINGLE POINT FAILURE SUMMARY 
Five cotnponents have been added to the Array D ASE which would 
constitute loss of either the Thumper or ASE in the event of failure in the 
particular mode as specified in enclosure I. Weight, power, and space 
constraints have ruled out the possibility of making these elements redundant. 
The probability of any of these devices failing in a single point failure mode 
is relatively insignificant when compared to the total number of single point 
failures already in the ASE. 
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Replace with the attached new FMECA work sheets: 
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NO. RI V. MO. 
ATM 501 B-3 
PAGE I Of 10 
DAT E 8/6/71 
~ 
~ 
~Y:f»TEM I"'P.i' P.l.ili;.U t::l ~:~MSOl ~:_3 -ALSEP R. J. Dallaire 
MODE. EFFECT 
E1U llt:.M ASE/CE IOo\G NU· 2346700 Fli.GE3. 9. 45,'1 FAILURE & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ~:n 16 Ch. MUX ,_,......_,NU. 2346711 !JA~E p./zo/7o 
CIRCUIT F.:FFECT CF FAILURE . FAILURE cRtnc-l OR ASSlM.D FAILURE MODE. CAUSE OF FAILURE ! PROBABILITY FtJNCT!ON £NO ITEM SYSTEM Q x IC-5 ALin' 
1.0 First Tier 1.0 Failure as Shown Below 1.0 ~l'" t.~rical Failure 1. (! ASE MUX Affected as Shown 1.0 Output Affected as Shown .00300 3 
Channel 
I Encoder 1.1 One First Tier MOS FET 1.1 Output of SN54L20 Faih , I. I (3 of 4 Channels of each I. I !..oss of 12 Channels 
Gate in Each of the Four High First Tier MOS FET Chip 
I MOS-FET Chips is Always will be Lost 
"On". I 
1. 2 One First Tier MOS FET 1. Z Output of SN54LZO Falh l.Z One Channel From each · I. Z Lou of 4 Channeh 
Gate in Each of the Four Low First Tier MOS Chip Lost 
MOS-FET Chips is Always ... 
"Off". 
. 
1.3 First Tier MOS FET Gate 1.3 Input Faih Open or Short 1.3 One Channel From each 1.3 Lou of 4 Channels 
Always "Off". First Tier MOS Chip Lost 
--· 




-2 . 1 Second Tier MOS FET z. 1 Output of SN54LZO Fail~ 2. 1 3 of 4 First Tier MOS Chip 2. 1 Loss of 12 Channels 
Gate Alway s "On" High Lost 
z. 2 Second Tier MOS FET 2.2 Output of SN54L20 Faile z.z One Firat Tier MOS Chip 2. Z Loss of 4 Channels 
Gate Alway s "Off" Low Lost 
2. 3 Second Tier MOS FET Z.3 Input Faile Open or Short Z.3 One First Tier MOS Chip Z.3 Loss of 4 Channels 
Gate Always "Off" Lost 




3 . 1 Driven MOS FET Always 3 . 1 Driver Output Faile High 3. 1 One Channel From each 3. l Lo s s of 4 Channels 
"Off" Firat Tier Chip Lost 
3 . 2 Driven MOS F ET Always 3. Z Drive r Output Fail• Low 3 . Z 3 of 4 Channels From Each 3 . Z Lou of 12 Channels 




I I5Y~TEM 1!-'f.i' P~il~Q. El''( N.. F-'-'· -:I ' ' ALSEP R. J . Dallaire ATM501• -:a.;3 i 
CRITICALITY ' I 
PI> ITEM ASE/CE·' ,f.JN:J NV· 2346 700 ~GE 3:9. 4-9._~ · I FAILURE MODE. 'EF'FECT & ANALYSIS ~y 16 Ch. MUX ~WGNU. 2346711 p.l.TE 8 20 i70 
CIRCLJT I F.FFECT CF FAILURE FAILUQE CRITIC-OR A5SLMED FAILURE MODE CAUSE OF FAILURE PROBABILITY 
AL.ITY FUNCTION ENO ITEM SYSTEM 
·ax 1(s 
4. 0 Second 4.0 Failure as Shown Below 4. 0 Electricd Failure 
Tier MOS 
4. o· MUX Affected as Shown 4.0 Output Affected as Shown 
.00240 5 
FET Gate I 
Drivers 
4. I Driven MOS FET Alway1 4..1 Driv~r Output Faih High 4. 1 One Firat Tier MOS Chip 4. 1 Loss of 4 Channels 
"Off" Lo•t 
4. 2 Driv~n MOS FET Always 4. 2 Driver Output Faile Low 4. 2 3 of 4 Firat Tier Chips 4. 2 Loss of 12 Channels 
"On" Lost 
5.0 First Tier 5. 0 Failure as Shown 5.0 Electrical Failure 
FET 
5. 0 MUX Affected as Shown 5.0 Output Affected as Shown 
.00600 I 
5. I Loss of a Gate on Chip 5. 1 Short Source-Gate or Any 5. I Loss of 1 Channel 5. I I;-oss of 1 Channel 
Open 
5.2 Loss of MX02D Chip 5. 2 Short Drain-Substrate, 5. 2 Loss of 4 consecutive 5. 2 Loss of 4 Channeh 
Source..Substrate, Drain- Channels · ' 
Gate, or Gate -Substrate 
J 
5. 3 Loss of Other Gates on 5. 3 Short Drain-Source 5.3 Lose of 3 Consecutive 5.3 Loss of 3 Channels 
. Chip Channell 
5.4 Loss of MX02D Chip 5. 4 Short Drain-Sub~trate of 5.4 Loss of 4 Consecutive 5.4 Loss of 4 Channels 
Used Gates Channels 
6. 0 Second 6 . 0 Failure as Shown 6.0 
Tier FET 
Electrical Failure 6. 0 MUX Affected as Shown 6 . 0 Output Affected as Shown . 00600 1 
6. 1 Loss of Gate on Chip 6. 1 Short Source - Gate or Any 6. 1 Lou of every 4th channel 6. 1 Loss of 4 Channels 
Open 
6. 2 Loss of MX02D Chip 6. 2 Short Drain-Substrate, 6.2 Lon of all channels 6. 2 Loss of all Channels 
Source ~Substrate, Drain 
Gate, or Gate-Substrate 
6.3 Loas of Other Gates on Chip 6. 3 Short Drain-Source 6.3 Loss of All Channels 6.3 Loss of 12 Channels 
6. 4 Loss of MX02D Chip 6. 4 Shor t Drain-Substrate of 6. 4 Los a of All Channel• 6.4 Loss of all Channels 
Unused Gates 
'--
ISYS.TEM . -~t:OlW 
AI.SEP IR • .T. DallairP-TABLE U IENOJTEfof jCMGNCJ. 
ASE/CE 2~4f.7nn 




ASSLKO FALURE MoDE 
I. 0 Oscillator- I!. 0 Oscillator Fails as Shown 
Clock 
I 
I. 1 Oscillator Fails to Proviile 
Output 
1. Z OscillAtor Frequency Drift 
2. 0 Input Buffer • 0 Buffer Fails as Shown 
j2. 1 Loss of Input to Comparator 
F:FFECT CF FAILURE 
CAUSE OF FAILURE 
I, 0 Failure of Discrete Parts 
or Integrated Circuits 
END ITEM 
1. C. Clc.c:l-:. Affected as Shown 
1. 1 Short or Open Rl, RZ, R3, R4U. 1 Lou of Clock to Counters 
RS, C1, C2, Yl, or Failure 
of NG1A, NGlB, NGlC 
SYSTEM 
• 0 Output Affected as Shown 
1. 1 Output will be Frozen 
l, Z Crystal (Yl) Parameter Drift 11. Z Counters Will Count at Wrong 11. 1 Output Slightly High or Low 
-Speed 
2. 0 Failure of I. C. or 'capacitor jz. 0 Analog Input Affected 
as Shown 
12. 1 Short C4, Failed Output of 
LM102 Low 
• 0 Output Affected as Shown 
~· 1 Ou~put a ll 1'a or O's r I Anolog lnpul_Appom High •• 
t· Z Offset Input to Com parator r~· Z Input Offset Drift of LMlOZ • Z Offset Input Voltage t· Z Slight Error in Output 
• 3 Noise to Input of Comparator Z. 3 Open C4 • 3 Chance of Small Errors in • 3 Occaasionai Error in Output 
3: 0 Comparato-.l3. 0 Comparator Fails a s Shown 
(Compares 
Ramp Vol-
tag e to t· 1 Loss of Command Latch 
Analog Signal 
Input 
Voltage } 3. Z Comparator Will Swi t ch too 
Soon or too Lat e 
3. 3 Noise in Comparator 
3, 0 Failure of Discrete Parts or 
I. C.'s 
3.1 Open RS, R13, or short R6, 
C7, or failure of LMlll, X5. 
3. 2 LMlll Input Offse t Drift 
3. 3 Open C5 or short Rl2 
Conversion I . 
3. 0 Ramp Comparison Affected !3. 0 Output Affected as Shown 
3, 1 Counters Will Count Erron- b. 1 Output will be Random or All 
eously I Zeros 
3, Z Count Will be Slightly too High b. 2 Output will be Slightly High or 
or too Low I Low 
~. 3 Chance Count Will be Low b. 3 Occasional Slightly Low Output 
~ 
~ 
~~,'r~s-~ t- r-i':3 
PAGE -~ :. 9. 49. 3· 
p;;'FE ~; : 20 l 70 
FAILURE 
PP!OBABlUTY 







15YS TEM !l"PF~~~ 
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(END IT9J..SE/CE f"G /IIJ. Z346700 




A5SUY£0 FAILURE MOOE CAUSE CIF FAILURE 
4. 0 Ra:tn? r· 0 Ramp Generator Fai!s •• Slownr· 0 F.dlure of Discrete D"vices 
Generator Shown .or I. C. 
. I Ramp Generator Will Cease tor· 1 Open or Short RB, R9, RIO, 
Function R11, Rl4, RlS, C3, CRZ, Ql 
Open R7, or LM107 Failure 
F.FFECT CF FAILURE 
END ITEM 
4, 0 Ramp Generator Affected as 
Shown 
14. 1 Counter Will Not Turn Off 
SYSTEM 
4. 0 Output Affected as Shown 
J4. 1 Output Will Be Random 
tl· Z Incorrect Ramp Slope ~. 2. Drift of CR2., RB, R9, RlO,. 14.2 Counter Turned Off too Soon 
Rtl, C3, or Input Offset Drift or too Late 
14, 2 Output Slightly High or Low 
of LM107 
~- 3 Exceas Current in Zener CRl j4. 3 Short R7 4. 3 -lZ'V Supply May Be Shorted 4. 3 Possible Loss of AID Con-
verter (Will Cause PDU to 
Switch to Redundant AID 
Converter) 
Supply as Shown 
5. 0 Power JS. 0 On-Board Supplies Affected · 5, 0 Failure of Capacitors as S!Dwnl5, 0 On-Board Supplies Affected 
As Shown 
5, 0 Output Affected as Shown 
Noise 
Suppressio 5.1 Loss of -lZV or +5V Linea 5, 1 Short C8 or C9 
5. 2 Noise on +lZV, -12, or SV 
Unes 
5.2 OpenC6, C7, CB, or C9 
5. 3 Loss of +12V Une Capacitor IS. 3 Short C6 or C7 
6. 0 Thermistorl6. 0 Thermistor Affected as Shown 16. 0 Resistor Failures as Shown 
Network 
6. 1 Improper Voltage Supplied to J6. 1 Open or Short Rl6, R7 
Thermistors 
6. 2 Drift in Voltage Supplied t o 
Thermistors 
6, 2. Drift Rl6, Rl7 
5,1 Losa of One MUX- AID Conv.l5.1 Loss of One AID Converter 
5, Z Chance Erroneous Count 
5·, 3 No Effect Due to Redundant 
Capacitors 
5. 2 Occas~onal Output Err·or 
5, 3 No Effect 
6. 0 Thermistor Readings Affected 16. 0 AID Converter Operation 
as Shown not Affected 
6, 1 Thermistor Readings Offscale 16, 1 Thermistor Offscale High or 
High or Low Low 
6. 2. Thermistor Readings Slightly 
High or Low 
6. 2. Thermistor Slightly High or 
Low 
.\S) 
"'i TMso1 · Fs-3 
.• ~ ~~J~50.I ' 
~TES / 2.0 /70 
FAILURE I Cl'liTIC-PROBABI~Y AUTY Q x IC 
.017864 
• 000804 ~ 




·I!>Y!)TEM ALSEP ·' ·'"l"t.¥:,.~ . !NO l"t.~ 
J 
R. J. a,llaire ATMSOj'- ' B-·3 
t.l'V ~lt.M ASE/CE .l:MG NV• 2346719 ~~-£~~so. 2 
FAILURE MODE. EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS .. ~~YC".nnv .n ... it~ll'\,.: ~MJ • ~TE '"'·t'-'7./. R ' 20 t;o • 
. CIRClfl F.FFECT CF FAILURE FAILURE CRITIC-P~BABIUTY 
' 
OR . ASSU-£0 FALuRE MODE CAUSE OF FAILURE £NO ITEM SYSTEM a x 1c-5 ALITY A.,'-K.;T!CN 
I Counter I. 0 Counter Controls Fail as 1.0 I. C. :t•aaure 1. 0 Co•1ntttr Control Affected as l. 0 Output Affected as Shown .005900 ! I. 0 2 
Control Shown Shown 
Circuitry 
1. 1 Counters Will Not Change 1.1 Failure of NGI, NG2, HlA, l. 1 Lose of Control to Counters 1. 1 Output Will be Random 
States HZA, HZB, HI C, X2 
2.0 Counter 2. 0 ·Counters or Buffers Fail 2.0 I. C. Failure 2. 0 Counters and Buffers 2. 0 Output Affected as Shown • 009600 1 
Circuitry As Shown Affected as Shown 
and Output . 
Buffers 2. 1 Higher Order Stages Will 2. 1 Failure of X4 or XS 2. 1 Higher Order Bits Frozen 2. 1 Higher Order Bit• Frozen 
Not Change States 
2. 2 Counter "Over Count" When 2.2 Failure of X6 High z. 2 When Analog Input is Over 2. 2 An Anal~g Input of Greater 
Analog Input is Over SV SV Counters Will Recycle than SV will Digitally Read 
Lees Than 5 V, Analog Inputs • 
Under SV Will be Unaf!ected 
Z. 3 Counters Stop Counting 2.3 Failure of X6 Low 2. 3 Counters Will Stay at Zero 2.'3 Output Always Read Zeros 
After .Reset 
'2. 4 One Output Bit Always High 2.4 Failu-re of Buffer . Gate High 2, 4 One Bit Erroneous, Other 7 2. 4 One Bit Erroneous 
or Low or Low Will Be Okay 
3.0 Voltage 3. 0 Noise Suppressor Fails as 3,0 Discrete Parts Failure 3, 0 Digital Circuitry Affected 3. 0 Output Affected as Shown 
.005210 3 
Supply Shown as Shown 
Noise 
Suppres- 3, 1 Loss of +SV to Board 3, 1 Open R1 or Short Cl 3. 1 Digital Circuitry Will Cease 3. 1 Outputs Will Appear to be 
sion to Function All Ones 







J. Da~laire ~iir-Msn ,.: M~3 I ALSEP R 
~ lltM ASE_A::E . UWb NOi346700 PAGE 3. 9 •. so.3 
FAILURE MODE. EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET IA(,:.·th . 1 . o • Multiplexer pwo NO. 2346711 PI'T~~ ' ~O t; n 
FM"Tj~ · EFFECT OF !"AlL-URE FAILUR! CRITlC-FAILURE MODE PROBABI~TY ALITY SYMBOL ( «.) ASSEMBLY END ITEM Q )( 10 
ro 
I. 0 First Tier chan- • 1 Output of SN54LZO Fails High (.400) 1. 1 One First Tier MOS FET Gate in Each 1. 1 Lou of 1l. Channels, (3 of 4 Channels .OOIZ I ''* 
nel Encoders .of the Four MOS-FET Chips is Always of each First Tier MOS FET Chip wil 
(SN54.LZO) liOn". be Lost) 
• Z Output of SN54LZO Fail8 Low (.400) 1, Z One First Tier MOS FET Gate in Each 1. Z ~u of 4 Channel8, (One Channel .0012 1 
I of the Four ¥OS-FED Chips ls Always From Each Firat Tier MOS Chip) 
"Off". 
• 3 Input Fails Open or Short (.ZOO) 1. 3 Firet Tier MOS FET Gate Always 1. 3 · Lou of 4 Channela (One Channel .0006 z 
"Off", From Each Firat Tier MOS Chip) 
Z. 0 Second Tier • 1 Output of SN54LZO Fails High (.400) z. 1 Second Tier MOS FET Gate Alway• z. 1 Loss of lZ Channels (3 of 4 First Tier • QOlZ 1** 
Channe1Encod~ra IIQnll MOS Chips) 
(SN54LZO) . 
• Z Output of SN54LZO Falla Low (.400) Z. Z Second Tier MOS FET Gate Alway• Z. Z Lou of 4 Channels (One Firat Tier 
.0012 1 
"Off" MOS Chip 
• 3 Input F a ils Open or Short (.ZOO) Z. 3 Second Tier MOS FET Gate Always z. 3 Loss of 4 Channels (One Firet Tier • 0006 z 
"Off" MOS Chip) 
3. 0 First Tier MOS 3. 1 Output Fails High (,500) 3. 1 Driven MOS FET Always "Off" • 3, 1 Loss of 4 Channels (One Channel • OOIZ 1 
FET Gate Driver From Each First Tier Chip) 
(OM 7800) 
:s. Z Output Fails Low (. 500) 3, 2 Driver MOS FET Always "On'' 3. Z Loss of lZ Channels (3 of 4 Channels . OOIZ l** 
From Each First Tier Chip) I 
4. 0 Second Tie r ~. 1 Output F a ils High (.500) 4. 1 Driver MOS FET Always "Off" 4. 1 Loss of 4 Channels (One Firat Tier .OOIZ 1 
MOS FET Gate MOS Chip) 
Drivers (DM7800 





5. 0 First Tier MOS 
FET (MXOZD) 
6. 0 S~cond Tier MOS 
FET (MXOZD) 
F>YltTEM A LS!:P 
~ ITFM ASE~E 
FAILURE MODE:, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET tfGi'h. MUX 
EFFECT OF FAILURE 
FAILURE MODE (a.) ASSEMBLY 
r· 1 Short Source-Gate or Any Open (. 373) 15. 1 Lou of a Gate on Chip 
• 2 Short Drain-Substrate, Source - IS. Z Lou of MX02D Chip 
Substrate, Drain-Gate, or Oats-
Substrate (. 2. 13) 
Short Drain-Source (. 080) r· 3 Lou of Other Gates oil Chip 
Short Drain-Substrate of Unused · 5. 4 Lou of MXOZD Chip 
Gates (.040) 
• 1 Short Source - Gate or Any Open(. 373),6. 1 Loaa of Gate on Chip 
• Z Short Drain-Substrate, Source- 6. Z Lose of MXOZD Chip 
Substrate, Drain-Gate, Drain-
Gate , or Gate-Substrate (. 213) 
I>· 3 Shor t Dra in-Souce (. 080) 16. 3 Lou of Other Gates on Chip 
t'>· 4 Shor t Dra in-Substrate of Unused 
Gates (, 040) 16. 4 Loaa of MXOZD Chip 
* Single Asterisk Denotee Lou of All 
16 Channell. 
** Double Asterisk Denotes Lou 12 
Channels Which Implies the Lou of 
More than One Geophone Channel. 
Only Criticality Numbers Having 
Asterisks are Termed "Serious 
Failure Modes", 
ENO ITEM 
5. 1 Los~ :.£ 1 Channel 
5. Z Lou of 4 Channels 
I 5. 3 Lon of 3 Channels 
I 5. 4 Lou of 4 Channels 
I 6. 1 Loss of 4 Channels 
I 6. Z Loss of All Channels 
I 6. 3 Loas of 12 Channels 
6. 4 Loss o£ All Channels 
\ r .\ \~ 
...., BY 
R. J. D'lllaire ~TM~o1EB-3 
IOWG ~·346700 !PAGE 3, <),.~n.- 1 1 
pw6 NO. 2.346711 jUAfES / 20 / 70 
FAILURE 



















ALSEP ~: Ll'aifaiee "X1'Msor Fb..:'3 
tJ"V III:M ASE/CE p~ r.u, Z346i00 IP<\GE 3:.9: 5) .z: 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET A?.::.~Tc AI onv. Analog BJti fJWb Nl). 2346719 . itJATfg / 20 / 70 
FMT/~ EFFECT OF FAILURE FAILURE CRITIC-FAILURE MODE PROBABIWY ALITY 5YMBOL ~a.) ASSEMBLY END ITEM Q )( 10 
1.0 Oscillator 1.1 Short or Open Rl, RZ, R3, R4, R5, 1. 1 Oscilaltor Will Fail to Provide Output 1. 1 Lose of Clock tc Counters .004313 1 
Clock: R1, RZ, Cl, CZ, Y1, or Failure of NGlA, 
R3, R4, RS, C1, NGlB, NGlC (. 533) . 
CZ, Y1, NG1A, 
NGIB, NG_1C 1.2. Crystal (Y1) Drift (. 371) 1. 2 Oscillator Frequency Drift 1. 2 Counters Will ~unt at Wrong Speed • 003000 .. .. 
z.o Input Buffer: Z. 1 Short C4, Output LM102 (. 776) 2. 1 Lou of Input to Comparator 2. 1 Analog Input Appears High or Low .003503 l 
LM102, C4 
Z. Z Input Offset Drift (. 193) 2. 2 Offset Input to Comparator 2. 2 Offeet Input Voltage • 000870 z 
. 
z. 3 Open C4 (.030) 2. 3 Noiee to Input of Comparator Z. 3 Chance of Stnall Errors in Conversion 
.000134 : ~ 
3. 0 Comparator: 3. 1 Open R12, Rl3, Short Rl3, C5; 3. 1 Lou of Command Latch Signal 3. 1 Counters Will Count Erroneously .004020 I 
R12, R13, CS, Failure of. LMlll, X5 (. 798) 
LMlll , XS 
. 
3. 2 LM111 Input Offset Dr ift (.140) 3. 2 Comparator Will Switch too Soon or 3. Z Count Will be Slightly too High or 
. 000810 -~ 
too Late too Low 
I 
3. 3 Open CS , Short Rl2 (.002) 3. 3 Noise in Comparator 3. 3 Chance Count Will be Low 
.000003 3 
4.0 Ramp Generatpr: 4.1 Open or Short R8, R9, RIO, R11, 4. 1 Ramp Generator Will Cease to 4. 1 Counter Will Not Turn Off • 009248 1 
R7, R8, R9, RIO Rl4, Rl5, C3, CR2, Ql, Open R7, Function 
Rll, Rl4, RIS, or Output Failure of LMl 07 (.442) 
C3, CIZ, Ql, 
LMI 07 4. z Drift of CRZ, R8, R9, RIO, Rl t 413 ) 4. 2 Incorrect Ramp Slope 4. 2 ·Counter Turned Off too Soon or too .008631 z Late 
4. 3 Short R7 (. 001) 4 . 3 Exceu Current in Zener CRl 4 . 3 -12V Supply May Be Shorted • 00003 3 
5.0 Supply Noise 5. 1 Short CB, C9 (. 070) 5. 1 Lou of -12V or +SV 5. 1 Lou of One MUX-A/D Converter • 000060 2 
Suppres sion 
C6, C7, C8, 5. 2 Open C6 , C7, C8, C9 (, 798) 5. 2 Noise on +12, -12, & +5V Lines 5 . 2 Chance of Erroneous Count .000684 1 
C9 
5. 3 Short C6, or C7 (. 070) 5. 3 No Effect Due to Redundant Capacitor 5. 3 No Effect . 000060 2 
6.0 Thertniator 6. I Open o r Short R l 6, Rl7 (. 817) 6. 1 Thertnistors Not Supplied Proper 6. 1 Incorrect Thermis tor Outputs 
Network: R16, Voltages .000274 I 
Rl7 6. 2 Drift Rl6, Rf7 (. 183) 6, 2 Thermistors Not Supplied Exact 6. 2 Slight Error in Thermistor Outputs 
• 000061 < Voltages 
· -
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
r OF I I EFFEC' ~ . FAILURE MODE a, ASSEMBLY END ITEM 
..... -
I. 0 Counter Con~ro1 I 1. 1 Any Failure of Digital Circuitry (1. 0011. 1 Lou of Control to Counters 
Circuitry: NGI, 
NGZ, HIA, HZB, 
HIC. XZ 
2. 0 Counter Circuitry 
and Output &ffers 
HZ, HIE, HIF, 
X4, X5, X6 
2. 1 Failure of Any Stage' in Counters~ 631J2. 1 Higher Order Stagea W.ill Not Change 
State• 
2. 2 Failure of X6 High 
2. 3 Failure of X6 Low 
(.09512. 2 Overvo1tage Analog Input Will Allow 
Counters to Overcount 
(.063j2. 3 Countera Will Stop Counting 
1. 1 Counters Will Not Ch<>.np:e State 
:z. 1 Higher Order Bits Erroneous 
~· ZAll Analog lnpute Over 5V Will 
Digitally Read Less Than 5V All 
Others Are OK 
2. 3 Counters Will Stay At Zero After Reset 
2. 4 Failure of Output Buffer Gate (.21lj2. 4 One Bit Will Alway• Be High or Low 12. 4 One Bit Will Be Erroneous All Others 
Will Be OK 
3. 0 Supply Decouplingt 3. 1 Open Rl ; Short Cl 
Rl, Cl 
3. 2 Open Cl , Short Rl 
(. 72913. 1 Lou of +5V to Board 3. 1 Outputs Will Appear to be All Ones , 

















• • ~ < ~--
~ 
Reliability Failure Mode, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis 
Addendum 3 ASE 
Attachment II 
Add to ATM 501-B the following new FMECA work sheets: 
Page 3. 9. 85 
3. 9. 86 
3. 9. 87 
3.9.88 
NO. REV. MO. 
ATM 501 B-3 
PAGE 1 OF 5 
DATE 8/6/71 
I' AlLURE MODI!, I!I'I'!CTS, AHO CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHI!!T ~ 
ASSY FAILURE DESCRIPTION REL~~~ItiTY 1 s~~PLI~~ NAME 
1 
1 MISSION PNASE(S) ASSY Dwc; OR s~ RE~ERENCE I OIIIGI NATO.R 








s;TATEMENT o~ THE AssuMED FAILuRE 
Loss of series diode D£> Open 
Short 
Lou of parallel diode .D7 Open 
Short 
Loss of parallel capacitor c~ I Open 
Short 
' 
Loss of diode 08 QP,en 
s~y~~l 
i.o~s of re'sr.tor • R • ·' OP,en 
Short 










'·' ,, ' 
(0.090) 
l ) . :i 
(0. 100) 
I ~01-S t 1P. 'McGinnis 
SYSTI!M 
EFFECT ON ASSEMIILYI !FFECT NU~'tiER 
P:AILUR! 
I'ROBABILITY 








o. 010 I 4. 900 
o. 010 I 4. 900 
o. ooo I 4. 900 
Lon of mortar I 0. 046 14. 900 
impact data 
Degraded I 0. 010 IS. 590 
mortar impact 
data 
Lon of mortar I 0, 046 I 8. 590 
impact data 
I L-ou of o.ue . s~del ~· ~1 0 ,4. 9.00 
.otf Bandw1dth ··' 
Limiti;,g ' I ~oes of mortar 0.046 4.900 
impact d~~o.t<l. \ I, · 4 ." 
.J . 3 .. 
Loll a Q! mhrtar 0.046 9. 500 
!n:tpact data . 
l:Joes o; o::,~·i~e ~·.11~;1~ ~9~ ;0~· 
of bandwidth 
I 
( !limiting (), i ·I) . . . .. < 
··· ·..:. I" Li v p _, , 
5\4 I 
IJ ·.: . . i . 
' 
- ... · ~ \\9 
~N~AIMsiu) -' IREv . • u) . .. ---t ·· 
· B-3 ' 




SUBSYSTEM NAM~ IASSEMII LY NAME 
Active Seismic EM! 
Experiment Modifications 
DESIGN CO!APENSATI ON 
















' (' ~ j • ... 
RAHK tRELIABILITY 
FOR MODEL CODE 












SHE!T __L· OF -2_ 
~ 
NO. lR!Y.HU ATMSOl ~ B-3..: 
.ULUR! MOO!, EI'I'!CTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WOIKSH!IT 
PAGI! 3. Cf, 86 OF 89 ·, PAGES 
.SSY FAILURE DESCRIPTION RELIABILITY SUPPLIER NAME MISSION PHASE(S) ASSY DWG OR SK REFERENCE ORIGI HATO.R DATE SUBSYSTEM HAM~ ASSEMBLY NAME GOAL 
INITIAL , _ ·a*A 
.: ~233039'9-2 st P. McGinnis REVISION Active Seismic EMI 
Experiment Mgdifications 
STATEMENT OF TH!! A~SUM!.D PAILU.JI! SYSTEM FAILURE DESIGN COMPcHSATI ON PROBABILITY PART, COMPllNEHT6 UNIT I CIRCUIT FAILURE EFFECT ON ASSEMBLY EFFECT • PROBABILITY CRITICALITY RANK RELIABILITY ITEM. SET OR BOX UCR I'TIOH 1100! TO ELIMINATE THI! PRODUCT FOR MODEL CODE HUMBER • to5 FAILURE MODE · (cr) (I!) (Q) (a) • (E). (Q). 1oS A5SY ID~HTIFICA TION 
30 MHz events cryetal Loss of function Open (0. 333) Loss of mortar 0.046 zo.ooo o. 30636 3 . filter impact data 
Short (0.167) Loa a of mortar 
impact data 
0.046 zo.ooo 0.15364 7 




SHUT ~ . 01' ? 
"LUitl NODI!, EFfECTS, AHD CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEIT 
SST FAII.URE DESCRIPTION RELIABILITY I SUP PLIER NAMI! 
GOAt. 
I~ ' J\ 
BxA 
PART, CDI!"0NENT6UNITI CIRCUIT I STATEMENT OF THF. ASSUMEO ~AILURI! 
ITEM, SET OR BOX ESCR PTION . · · 
<humper line (3 ea.) 
Filters ,WL~LP 1 · 
vtortar package assembly 
line ferrite filtera FL-Fl 
70-7A ' 
Loss of ferrite filter: 
29 V operate line 
Common return line 
Thumper arm line 
Lose of MPA Line filters: 
Z9 V survival line 
One of: 
Z9 V operate line 
15 V pwr line 
5 V pwr line 
Loss of one of remaining 




Open (0. 800) 










Short (to gnd) (0.100) 
Open (0. 900) 





A$SY DWG OR $1( Rl!. ~I!RENCE IORIGINATO,R 
l. ~ ' 4. 'L I 4 ,., ,. I \ ' . " .. -
Z334794N P. McGinnis 
~~lt.URE 
PROBABII,.ITY 
• lo' (Q), 
Lou of thumper I 0. 046 I 4. 400 
Lou of thumper I 0, 046 I 4, 400 
fL.ou of thumper I 0, 046 I 4, 400 
f•sracled data I O. 010 I 4. 400 • 










o. 010 I 4. 400 
0. OZ3 116. 86 
o. 046 116.86 
0, OZ3 116. 86 
o. 067 116.86 
O.OZ3,16.86 
0. OZ3 16.86 
\ 
NO . •. • • , lREY. NO -
ATMscn· , 1 B-3 




SUBSYSTEM NAME A$SEMa L Y NAME 
I PROBABILITY DESIGN COMPENSATION CRITICALITY 1 RANK rEUAI!II.ITY TO ELIMINATE THE PRODUCT FOR MOOEL CODE FAILURE MODI! (a\ • lEI• (Q) • lo' IlSSY IIIENTI~ICATIOH 
--
0.16192 5 : 
~ -% .' r, : 
o. 04048 11 I 
0.16192 5 
0.00880 r: 0.08096 
0.00880 . zo 
o. 34900 z 
0.07756 10 
0.34900 z 
0. 12814 8 
I . 
o. 34900 L! 0.03877 
SH!ET _L Of 7 
~' · ~ "'-
I 'v 
FAILURE WODE, EI'I'ECTS. AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORICSftii!T 
r SSY FAILURE DESCRIPTION R-ELIABILITY SUPPLIER NAME MISSION PHASI!(S) ASSY DWG OR SIC REI'!RENCE ORIGINATOR GOAL 
BxA Z334468J 
: ! 
I PART, COMPONENT6 UNIT( CIRCUIT $YSTEM FAILURE STA? EIAENT OF THE _ASSUIIE_D I'AILU.RE I'AILUR! EI'I'I!CT ON ASSI!IIBLY I!FFECT PROBABILITY ITEM, SET OR BOX UCR PTION MODI! ~UMBER 
• 1oS IGI. iE) (It) 
I A / D Converte~ Output Loss of one of ~ output chokes Open (0. 563) Degraded data 0.023 1. 000 
chokes 








970-7A \ .  
\ 
J 
NO. ATM 840 . I REV. N0'1 . B- . 
. -




DATE SUBSYSTEM HAM~ ASSEMBLY NAill! 
INITIAL 
REVISION 
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( 
Reliability Failure Mode, 
Ef.fects and Criticality Analysis 
Addendum 3 ASE 
Attachment III 
Add to ATM 501-B the following new FMECA work sheet: 
Page 3. 9. 89 
ATM 501 B-3 





~_r-t~p Array D i.'":"'s."M'o~owitz ~TMSOl Fv'B-3 
~,P~E Seismic IJWb NO, PAGE3. 9. 89 89 
FAILURE MODE. EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS .. ~;~1ra1 Station pw6 NO· ~lt. 7-27-71 
PART /C'CMI<MNT EFFECT OF FAILURE FAILURE CRITIC-FAILURE MODE PR8BxA~~~TY ALITY SYMBOL (a.) ASSEMBI..Y END ITEM 
-1. 0 A/D Converter 
board No. 1 
CIO Open .10 Small increase in EMI noiee Degradation of ASE .000000157 II 
C10 Short • 90 Pulle +5 volt line to ground Lou of ASE • 00000141 I I 2. 0 A/D Converter 
board No. 2 
L1 Open • 50 Loe 1 of +5 volt line Lou of ASE • 00000175 I 
Ll Short .so Small increau in EMI noiee Degradation of ASE • 00000175 II 
3. 0 A/D Converter 
analog assy 
Cll Open • 10 Small iDcreaee in EMI noiee Degradation of ASE • 000000157 II 
Cll Short .90 Pulll +5 volt line to ground Lou of ASE . 00000141 I 
4. 0 ASE/CSE board J 
A4 
. 
CR102. Open .4Q <;:ould not reaet F/F 19 Lou of thumper .0000080 I 
.. 
CR102. Short .60 Capacitor CS would charge too Possible lou of thumper . 000012.0 I 
quickly 
CR103 Open .40 Could not lD•ure preset of F /F 19 Possible loss of thumper • 0000080 I 
CR103 Short .60 Could reault ill exce11 current being Probably no effect on experiment . 000012.0 11 
sunk by 9041 gate 
•' 
--- ----- ---- ----
